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The Ethnic Security Dilemma and Ethnic Violence: An Alternative Empirical Model
and its Explanatory Power
Abstract
Beginning in the 1990s, a trend of using the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence has emerged.
However, previous research mainly focuses on individual cases with large-scale violence; whether ethnic
security dilemma theory is a sound approach to explain less violent ethnic conflict remains unclear. This
paper employs a large-N design and tests the hypothesis that the ethnic security dilemma causes ethnic
conflicts, without discriminating between differences in severity and scale of conflict. The paper also
conducts a longitudinal comparison with a previous quantitative model using the latest data available.
The empirical results do not support the hypothesis and suggest that the explanatory power of the ethnic
security dilemma has declined over time. Although there is no definite conclusion that the ethnic security
dilemma is not a useful explanation for less violent ethnic conflicts, given the limitations of this research,
I conclude with a theoretical discussion questioning the applicability of the theory. Supplemented with
this qualitative assessment, I conclude that a quantitative study of the ethnic security dilemma used to
explain ethnic violence may not be a viable option for future research in this field.
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THE ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE:
AN ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ITS EXPLANATORY POWER
Jiaxing Xu
Abstract: Beginning in the 1990s, a trend of using the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence has
emerged. However, previous research mainly focuses on individual cases with large-scale violence;
whether ethnic security dilemma theory is a sound approach to explain less violent ethnic conflict remains
unclear. This paper employs a large-N design and tests the hypothesis that the ethnic security dilemma
causes ethnic conflicts, without discriminating between differences in severity and scale of conflict. The
paper also conducts a longitudinal comparison with a previous quantitative model using the latest data
available. The empirical results do not support the hypothesis and suggest that the explanatory power of
the ethnic security dilemma has declined over time. Although there is no definite conclusion that the
ethnic security dilemma is not a useful explanation for less violent ethnic conflicts, given the limitations
of this research, I conclude with a theoretical discussion questioning the applicability of the theory.
Supplemented with this qualitative assessment, I conclude that a quantitative study of the ethnic security
dilemma used to explain ethnic violence may not be a viable option for future research in this field.
INTRODUCTION
The growing interest in the study of ethnic violence is partly the result of the sweeping
wave of bloody violence occurring after the Cold War, which left weakened Weberian states
extremely susceptible to a variety of violence, including ethnic violence.1 The study of ethnic
conflicts is a relatively new subfield within social science. Ethnic conflicts closely associate with
studies of ethnicity and nationalism on the one hand, and studies of political violence on the
other.2 Efforts have been made to foster disciplinary debates between those non-intersecting
literatures in the past decades, and, as a result, the domain of the study and key research
questions are more clearly formulated, with a central focus on the causes of ethnic violence.
Scholars have given various explanations, ranging from instrumentalists’ view of
relative deprivation to constructivists’ view of threatened identity. A trend of using the
international relations concept of the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence emerged in
the 1990s. Various case studies affirm that this causal mechanism provides an explanation for

1
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large-scale ethnic violence in particular countries, but only a few studies have attempted to
quantify this concept and empirically measure the explanatory power of this framework. Thus,
several critical questions remain unanswered or answered unsatisfactorily:
Is the ethnic security dilemma a coherent explanation of some lesser violent ethnic
conflicts? Is the ethnic security dilemma suitable for a mass application, or only to specific
cases? How should one approach a quantitative study aiming to operationalize this rather
complex concept? Has the explanatory power of ethnic security dilemma changed over time?
These questions are important because it must be determined whether the ethnic
security dilemma yields any fruitful results in a large-N study; the answer of which will direct
future research efforts. Only if such a study provides a promising outlook will a broader
application of this theoretical framework be justified. Otherwise, the use of the ethnic security
dilemma theory will be restricted to specific conflict dyads on a case-by-case analysis.
This research paper will attempt to address these problems and fill in the gap existing
in the current literature. Therefore, the central question of this research is: does the security
dilemma cause ethnic violence in a statistically significant way, regardless of the case’s scale
and severity? If so, to what extent does the effect the security dilemma explain the occurrence
and intensity of recent ethnic violence? If not, what are some problems with the theory in its
broader application, and is there any inherent limitation of this theory?
LITERATURE REVIEW
Ethnicity, Ethnic groups, and Ethnic Conflict
Ethnicity lacks a universally acknowledged definition, but I chose to base my paper on
Horowitz’s brief discussion of ethnicity and ethnic groups because of its well-balanced nature
and Horowitz’s recognized intellectual authority in the field.
He first quotes Enid Schidkrout’s formulation: “the minimal definition of an ethnic unit
[…] is the idea of common provenance, recruitment primarily though kinship, and a notion of
distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a unique inventory of cultural traits.”3 The core
definition of ethnicity, according to Horowitz, “embraces groups differentiated by color,

3
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language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and castes”4 and the membership
is typically not chosen but given.”5 Conflict is yet another fuzzy concept. This paper does not
attempt to clearly distinguish between conflict and violence, but rather to treat ethnic violence
as a violent and more severe variation of conflict. Simply put, “conflict is a struggle in which the
aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.”6
The combination of “ethnic” and conflict creates another interesting definitional
problem. Ethnicity may be at work in certain cases of violence, but they can hardly be said to be
ethnic conflicts if other factors primarily account for their occurrences. As Brubaker and Laitin
argue, how “ethnic” modifies “conflicts” or “violence” remains unclear and largely
unexamined.7 But several defining characteristics of ethnic conflicts can be summarized as
follows. First, ethnic conflicts are inter-communal, meaning two groups in a given conflict are
strictly identified by their kinship and ethnic identities. Second, two parties cannot both be
states or representatives of states.8 Third, motives of the conflicts are usually ethnically related
and common goals include to gain more political autonomy or to establish a separate state.
Theories of Ethnic Conflicts
Three general theoretical approaches that almost encompass all research of ethnic
conflicts are primordial, instrumental, and constructive. The primordial approach views ethnic
conflicts as unavoidable, because the problems root in the inherent differences between ethnic
groups. In other words, ethnic identity itself is the determinant of ethnic conflicts. In contrast,
the instrumentalist approach “understands ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or
elites to obtain some larger, typically material end.”9 Constructivists, on the other hand, see
ethnic identity as a social construction and thus each conflict has its special social origin.
Ethnic conflicts, in many respects, resemble political violence that takes place at the
interstate level. It is a natural progression for scholars to go beyond the realm of ethnic relations
and political violence and to ponder the possibilities of taking an interdisciplinary approach to
examine the cause of ethnic conflict.

Ibid.
Horowitz 1986, 56.
6 Horowitz 1986, 95.
7 Brubaker and Laitin 1998.
8 Ibid.
9 Lake and Rothchild 1998, 5.
4
5
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Security Dilemma as an International Relations Theory Concept
“The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals
who might be out to do deliberate harm to the world but with two actors each desperately
anxious to avoid conflict of any sort.”10

The security dilemma concept was first used by John Herz in 1951.11 The tragedy of
security dilemma becomes possible due to the anarchic nature of the international system and
inherent uncertainty and fear of states for their own security. Some important developments in
political psychology, especially Robert Jervis’ Perception and Misperception in International
Politics, open the door for a new way of thinking about international conflicts. The argument
that intentions of one party may be misperceived is a critical premise of the security dilemma.
Several other scholars outline the central theoretical framework of security dilemma as follows:
States are rational actors and self-help is the only way to guarantee the survival of the states in
an anarchic international society. Decision makers have to constantly perceive others’ intentions
but benign intentions of one party’s action (defensive, or merely aiming at increasing one’s own
security) can be misperceived as malign (offensive). Thus this misperception triggers a
counteraction which is not necessarily offensive but may be misperceived as well. Thus
confrontation escalates and securities of both actors decline. “The unique analytic core of the
security dilemma lies in situations in which one or more disputing parties have incentives to
resort to preemptive uses of force.”12
The Ethnic Security Dilemma: an Alternative Use
Recent studies have proven that the conceptual frame of the security dilemma is useful
when thinking about ethnic conflicts at the intrastate level, although its relevance may be
difficult to see at first sight. The application of the security dilemma was first popularized by
Barry Posen13. Posen articulates some interesting parallels between an international system and
ethnic relations within a state from a realist’s perspective. First, the collapse of imperial regimes
produces the problem of “emerging anarchy.” Second, ethnic groups behave as if they are states
without the assurance of their security by the state and thus “the security dilemma affects the

Butterfield 1952, 21.
Roe 1999.
12 Lake and Rothchild 1998; Leuprecht 2010; Roe 2002.
13 Roe 1999.
10
11
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relations among these groups, just as it affects relations among states.” Third, “the
indistinguishability of offence and defense” favors the worst-case analysis and preemptive
action.14 All these conditions will similarly generate a spiral of action and reaction that is
typically found in an international conflict. The most popular examples of the security dilemma
include the former Yugoslavia15, Moldova’s civil war16, and Croatia.17
Later development of this paradigm concerns what constitutes the security of an ethnic
group. Societal security, a dimension of state security that by itself can be a referent object18, is
viewed as very important for ethnic minorities. Societal security broadly captures traits relating
to the preservation of group identity, including language, customs, and religious practices.
Waver gives a formal definition of societal security:

“The ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions
and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within
acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture,
association, and religious and national identity and custom.”19
Survival of an ethnic group in this sense is less dependent on the economic power or
military strength, but on a sense of group cohesion and a guarantee of continual practice or
expression of its tradition. In addition, the ethnic security dilemma is “closer to a ‘perceptual
security dilemma’ rather than a ‘structural security dilemma.’”20 So actual conditions of the
security dilemma do not matter as much as whether the ethnic groups perceive such conditions.
The literature on security dilemma theory is largely comprised of qualitative analyses,
with a vast majority focusing on single or comparative case studies. Several prominent uses of
the concept include Kaufman’s Spiraling to Ethnic War (1996), in which he analyses Moldova’s
path to civil war. In this article, Kaufman reasoned that one condition of the ethnic security
dilemma is de facto anarchy. Paul Roe elaborates on the security dilemma by tracking the roots

Posen 1991, 27-33.
Dulic and Kostic 2010; Posen 1991.
16 Kaufman 1996.
17 Roe 2004.
18 Roe 1999.
19 Waver 1993; Roe 1999.
20 Kaufman 1996, 112.
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of several concepts involved and uses them to analyze the Hungarian-Romanian struggle---“the
Transylvania’s societal security dilemma.”21 One should notice that the security dilemma theory
is mostly used to explain large-scale ethnic conflicts that ultimately result in civil wars or ethnic
cleansings. Subsequent development of this strand of literature produces many variations.
Some scholars use the theory in a much limited sense, only explaining a single aspect of a case.
One example of this variation is the demographic security dilemma. The author shows that
how an economic project causes security dilemma between Hans and minorities in west
borders.22 Although those researchers use the core causal explanation provided by security
dilemma, these less rigid uses of the concept make their true applicability and its explanatory
power questionable.
Few attempts have been made to operationalize the security dilemma into a quantitative
analysis, or at least provide some statistical guidance on how powerful the paradigm is in
explaining ethnic violence. Unlike other approaches in which causes often have identifiable
indicators suitable for both qualitative accounts and statistical manipulations, the security
dilemma involves a causal chain and some not easily quantifiable concepts.
But in his book Anarchy Within, Erik Melander makes a breakthrough. He painstakingly
constructs a game theory model to capture the dynamics of the ethnic security dilemma.
Melander’s first step enables him to identify the dependent variable, “restraint breakdown”,
which is defined as the “preemptive resort to large-scale ethnic warfare.” He then derives three
empirical indicators, namely, status quo utility, fear, and first strike advantages, from his
previous game theory analysis. He further operationalized them into measurable independent
variables as separatist grievance, democracy, and ethnoterritorial dominance respectively. It is
expected that lower status quo utility, more fear, and high first strike advantage will lead to a
severe security dilemma and thus cause ethnic violence manifested in the form of warfare or
mass guerilla activity. His results provide “strong support for the notion that the Security
Dilemma is a sound causal mechanism of high relevance for explaining the outbreak of largescale ethnic warfare and cleansing in a context of political transition.” 23

Roe 2002, 67.
Clarke 2007.
23 Melander 1999, 109.
21
22
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This is a sound and logically coherent application of the security dilemma concept. But
several limitations are obvious. First, the scope of the study is limited. The ethnic security
dilemma may only provide explanations to severe ethnic conflicts. By setting a high threshold
in coding only cases with severe outbreaks of violence, Melander loses the opportunity to
investigate whether or not the theory can provide meaningful insight into ethnic violence in a
full spectrum. Second, as Melander himself admits, the indicators are somewhat crude. All
variables are dummy variables, while available data allows more accurate representation of the
concepts.
I will try to develop an alternative quantitative model, using Minorities at Risk (MaR)24
dataset, to test the soundness of security dilemma as a causal explanation of ethnic violence.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Does the security dilemma cause ethnic violence in a statistically significant way, given
all cases available? And if so, to what extent does the security dilemma affect the occurrence
and intensity of ethnic violence? If not, what are the implications of the results? My hypothesis
is straightforward: the more severe the security dilemma, the more severe the ethnic violence.
This hypothesis has been used or implied in many studies, but what differentiates this research
is the methodology.
Turning this hypothesis into a working one remains daunting because the ethnic
security dilemma, like many other complex theoretical concepts, lacks direct quantifiable
potential. Some scholars take an indirect approach to test this hypothesis in their studies, one of
which is to deliberately introduce intervening variables that are the logical consequences of the
ethnic security dilemma, and test the relationship between the intervening variables and the
dependent variables. This is problematic because intervening variables by themselves may
explain the ethnic violence without any reference to the security dilemma theory-an indirect
causation problem. Many more have chosen to give anecdotal accounts in their case studies to
make a qualitative assessment of the hypothesis. Another approach is to test variables that are
strongly indicative of, or that will cause an ethnic security dilemma. Melander takes a similar
path in his study.

24

Minorities at Risk Project 2009.
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I will try to justify my selection of several variables that constitute the ethnic security
dilemma and develop a testable model in a large-N design.

Components of the Security Dilemma
ANARCHY: In his work, Posen recognized that “emerging anarchy” is a precondition of
ethnic security dilemma.25 Anarchy, in an intrastate context, may not only refer to a lack of
central authority, but also to a lack of public services and various social programs that produces
a perception of a quasi-anarchic environment. It will lead to a security dilemma because when
groups perceive their governments as being unable to take action to protect their identities and
address their cultural concerns, they will increasingly rely on self-help. Lack of rule
enforcement provides motivation to resort to violence rather than an incapable superior
authority.
FEAR. Fear is an essential dimension of the security dilemma because any uncertainty of
the future will make members of ethnic groups feel vulnerable, and thus an action of the
opposed party will be more likely to trigger violent reactions. Different kinds of fear will
contribute to the ethnic security dilemma mechanism. I categorize fear into three variations: 1)
fear of loss of group identity; 2) fear of repression of ethnic tradition; 3) fear of physical survival
(ethnic cleansings) or prosperity of the community. Notice that the source of the fear does not
need to be specified, meaning that fear imposed on an ethnic group, regardless of whether it
comes from another group that is directly in conflict with or not, will have similar effects
because reaction is not necessarily targeted to the source of the fear. In other words, when A
group (or government) makes B group feel vulnerable, C group’s provoking action might lead
to B group’s violence.
MISPERCEPTION. The likelihood of misperception, according to the inner logic of the
security dilemma, should strongly correlate with the severity of the security dilemma, because
if information flows freely without any distortion, ethnic groups can easily recognize opposing
parties’ true intentions and seek peaceful solutions, rather than resorting to means that are
conducive to violence, such as building arms.
FIRST STRIKE ADVANTAGE. Melander gives a convincing argument why first strike
advantage is important to the operation of the security dilemma. “The argument goes that when
25

Posen 1991.
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different ethnic groups are interspersed in the same territory each side becomes extremely
vulnerable to attacks from the other,” and thus in ethnically diverse areas, advantage will be
gained if one group strikes first.26 The underlying logic is that ethnic groups will be more likely
to use preemptive strike to secure its regional position; otherwise, its power will be undermined
if other ethnic groups strike first. I decided to include the same indicator used by Melander for
first strike advantage, which is ethnoterritorial dominance.

Variable Operationalization
The work to transform variables into measurable indicators can be difficult because they
all have multiple theoretical dimensions with substantial abstractions. I admit that my
operationalization of the variables cannot fully capture what those concepts represent, but there
is some significant improvement from previous models. Minority at Risk project has collected
and compiled quantitative data for a variety of variables related to the characteristics and
activities of ethnic groups, which I use for most variables in this study.

Independent Variables
Anarchy: The World Bank has developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators to
measure governance and institutional quality. Among those indicators, Government
Effectiveness (“capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies”) and Regulatory Quality (“capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development”) are the best available quantitative indicators of anarchy in an ethnic
security dilemma context.27 In addition, they are perception-based instead of objective
evaluation of governments and therefore are more compatible with a constructivist view of
anarchy. I recode these two indicators into one variable, and a lower score indicates higher
anarchy.

26
27

Melander 1999, 81.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo 2010, 4.

RES PUBLICA

74

Fear: Melander argues that institutionalized democracy will produce less fear during
periods of political transition and therefore he uses democracy as an indicator of fear (measured
in the polity3d dataset).28 In addition, democracy may well measure the importance of political
institutions rather than fear. Political institutions play an important role in group conflict within
a state, so its mitigating effect is expected. Therefore, a more coherent indicator for fear must be
found, which, by itself, has no apparent explanatory power of ethnic violence. While restrictions
on language or religion are very good indicators of fear, they have the same problem as
“democracy.” Shifting focus from the external factors that might produce fear, I believe cultural
grievances, which are a clear indication of the cultural fear that ethnic groups have experienced,
represent the first two kinds of fear. On the other hand, I will use urbanity to measure the third
kind. William Rose examines Monic Toft’s work of the interesting link between settlement
patterns and rebellion. Rose derives an important observation from Toft’s finding that “with
stronger ties to the land and concomitant decision to remain, rural residents will likely react to
possible threats with more fear than urbanities.”29 Thus, the higher the proportion of urban
population, the less fear of physical survival within a given geological area. Both cultural
grievance and urbanities can be easily operationalized with “cultural grievance” and “urbanrural distribution” variables in the Minority at Risk dataset.
Misperception: While there is no perfect measure of what degree to which ethnic
groups will misperceive another party’s intentions, a distinctiveness index best serves this
function. If one ethnic group is sufficiently different from another one in terms of language,
customs, tradition, it will be difficult to understand the other party’s intentions. Channels of
obstructed information or actual occurrences of misperceptions are not measured here, rather
the likelihood of their occurrences. Misperception is operationalized by combining two
indicators in MaR dataset: “language” and “custom” variable, where higher scores indicate
more distinct languages spoken and customs held between ethnic groups.
First Strike Advantage: This variable will be operationalized into “the proportion of
group members in regional base” in MaR.
Dependent Variables

28
29

Melander 1999.
Rose 2011, 14.
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Two different types of ethnic violence are separately measured. Intercommunal conflict
is conflict with other ethnic groups that are not state representatives or dominant groups
exercising power. Rebellion, in contrast, requires the opposing ethnic group to be the dominant
group in power. My main dependent variable will be Violence, which is the combined score of
“intercommual conflict” and “rebellion”, although the two will be run as dependent variables in
separate models for comparative purposes.

Control Variables
Several control variables will be used in various models, including “index of lost
political autonomy” (AUTLOST), “separatism index” (SEPX), “political discrimination index”
(POLDIS), “economic discrimination index” (ECDIS), “group organization for joint political
action” (GOJPA). These variables (all from MaR) are selected such that they can capture a wide
range of possible explanations of ethnic violence.

Regression Models
The following are the regression models used to test my hypothesis.
Model 1:
Violence(“intercommunal”+ “rebellion”) =Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural
Grivance+Misperception index+Proportion of members in regional base
+AUTLOST+SEPX+POLDIS+ECDIS+GOJPA
Model 1 includes the four main variables and all control variables. My main focus on
this model will be the significance of each variable and the overall validity of this model.
Model 2:
Violence =Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception
index+Proportion of member in regional base
Model 2 is designed to measure the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma
by examining the R square.

Model 3:
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Intercommunal conflict=Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception
index+Proportion of members in regional base

Model 4:
Rebellion=Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception
index+Proportion of member in regional base

Only the dependent variable in Model 3 and 4 differs from Model 2. I break down
violence into two distinct types of ethnic violence to see how an anarchic situation will act
differently upon them. Intercommunal conflict should be more prevailing than rebellion given
any anarchic level since rebellion factors into government control. It is also a way to test the
internal validity of the anarchy variable.

Model 5:
Restraint Breakdown=Ethnoterritorial Dominance+Democracy+Political Grievance

In this model, I mimic Melander’s research model as much as possible, except that all the
data I use is from 2005 (including the use of Polity IV dataset30), while Melander’s data is from
1990 to 1994.31 This regression model will not only provide a longitudinal study comparison,
but also put my model in a comparative context. Several noticeable differences exist in my
operationalization: 1) Melander uses 70% as the threshold for ethnoterritorial dominance, while
I use 75% due to coding changes in the MaR dataset. However, the difference is negligible and
should have minimal impact on my analysis. 2) I substitute separatist grievance for political
grievance, which is the closest variable available. According to the new code book, a level of
political grievance at three or four represents grievances focused on “creating or strengthening
autonomous status” and “creating a separate state for group or revanchist change in boarders,”
respectively.32 It is comparable to the original indicator of Status Quo Utility. 3) Coding for
restraint breakdown should have only included cases of intercommunal conflict with a score of

Polity IV Project 2010.
Melander 1999.
32 Minority at Risk 2009, 14.
30
31
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5 and that have at least 500 casualties. However, a case by case determination of restraint
breakdown by examining each conflict’s casualty numbers is impossible for this research, and
this information is not readily available in any database. Therefore I suppose a limited number
of cases may be inappropriately coded.
DATA ANALYSIS
Results
Table 1: Regression Results for Model 1 to 4
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Violence
Independent Variable
Constant
Anarchy
Misperception
Urban rural distribution
cultural grievance
Regional base-proportion of group
members
Index of lost political
autonomy
Separatism index
political grievance
Political discrimination
index
Economic discrimination
index
Group organization for
joint political action

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.212

2.504***

1.937***

0.76*

(0.913)

(0.795)

(0.509)

(0.429)

-.98
(.100)

-0.152

(-0.088)

-0.067

(0.102)

0.066

(0.057)

-0.017

0.132

0.028

0.062

-0.205

(0.216)

(0.138)

(0.118)

-.050
(.133)
-.345
(.243)

-0.131

-0.096

-0.062

(0.141)

(0.091)

(0.079)

-0.263

-0.086

-0.156

(0.244)

(0.156)

(0.137)

0.071

0.157

-0.085

0.21***

(.144)

(0.137)

(0.088)

(0.076)

-0.05

(.215)
-0.108
(0.192)
0.237

(.185)
0.093

(.164)
0.112

(.178)
0.881***

(.187)

R-squared

0.207

0.051

0.022

0.08

Adjusted R-squared

0.167

0.03

0.001

0.06

Significance

.000

0.037

0.399

0.001

Note: standard errors in parentheses; *p≤.1, **p≤.05, ***p≤.01
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Since ethnic conflict is a complex phenomenon, it is not surprising that even though ten
different variables are included in the first model, they only explain twenty one percent of the
variance. None of the variables are significant except group organization for joint political
action, which is not only significant at a 0.001 level, but also has the strongest effect on violence
in the equation. All four main variables intended to operationalize the security dilemma are far
from any significance level and thus cannot yield any meaningful interpretations.
Model 2 is significant at .05 level, however, the individual variables are not significant.
In addition, the R2 value is very low, meaning that the equation has little predictive or
explanatory power for ethnic violence. Standardized coefficients of all variables have expected
signs, indicating that my theoretical expectations are correct. A closer observation reveals that
anarchy carries the most weight in the regression.
Model 3 is not significant, and intercommunal violence is hardly explained by the
model. Model 4 explains eight percent of the variance in rebellion, which is mostly contributed
by the proportion of group members in regional bases (first strike advantage). This variable is
significant at the .01 level. A regionally dispersed ethnic group is more likely to have ethnic
conflict with a central authority that represents another ethnic group.
The insignificance of my main variables is not a result of multicollinearity. According to
the correlation matrix (Table 2), none of variables strongly associate with each other.

Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Main Variables
Cultural
Anarchy Misperception grievance
Anarchy
Misperception
Cultural
grievance
Proportion of
group
members
Urban rural
distribution

Proportion
Urban
of group
rural
members distribution

1

-0.082

.261**

-.253**

.346**

-0.082

1

0.067

0.042

-.248**

.261**

0.067

1

-.148*

0.08

-.253**

0.042

-.148*

1

-.382**

.346**

-.248**

0.08

-.382**

1

Note: **p≤.01, *p≤.05 (2-tailed).
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Table three shows Melander’s model using comparable data from different times. In
terms of R square, Melander’s model does not have any better results. The R square is 5.6%,
very close to that of model 2. Political grievance has the most substantial effect on the
dependent variable, as it did in 1994 model. In addition, it is significant at 0.001 level. This data
suggests that the security dilemma theory has declined in explanatory power.
Table 3: Regression Results for Melander's Original Model and Model 5
Dependent Variable: Restraint Breakdown
Independent
Variable
Constant
Democracy
Ethnoterritorial
Dom.
Separatist (Political)
Grievances

Original

Model 5

-.652

0.054

(0.653)
-2.8***
(1.075)
-3.249***
(1.191)

(0.034)
-0.006
(0.03)
0.024
(0.039)

.9511***

0.148***

(.836)

(0.044)

R-squared
.507
.056
Significance
.000
.002
N
85
284
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *p≤.1, **p≤.05, ***p≤.0133

Research limitations
As discussed previously, I encountered many difficulties when trying to operationalize
the ethnic security dilemma concept. Thus, one must take into account limitations of my
research design when interpreting the results. A salient problem is partial measurement, as
indicators cannot fully capture the ethnic security dilemma phenomenon in its entirety. As a
result, R square values may be underestimated. In addition, a better time series analysis should
also retrospectively apply my regression model to the 1990-1994 data. In addition, although
MaR is a very inclusive database to study ethnic conflicts, it has its own case selection criteria
that might exclude some important cases.

33

Results of original research model compiled from Melander 1999.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Preliminary analysis of the data allows me to derive several observations. First, my data
does not support the hypothesis that the greater the presence of ethnic security dilemma
conditions, the more severe the ethnic violence. The research model, based on my ways of
operationalizing the ethnic security dilemma, suggests that ethnic violence is hardly explained
by the theory. Furthermore, ethnic security dilemma’s explanatory power has substantially
dropped from the previous research.
Do these observations imply that the ethnic security dilemma approach to studying
ethnic conflict is unlikely to produce fruitful results in the future? Given the limitations of this
research, I am hesitant to give a positive answer. However, if I supplement the quantitative
results with a normative analysis, the answer becomes clearer. The two questions I will try to
answer in the following analysis are: why is the ethnic security dilemma’s explanatory power
likely limited to case studies of large scale violence, and what might be the reasons that the
theory has become a less compelling explanation of ethnic violence in recent years?
To answer the first question, we need to revisit how the ethnic security dilemma works.
The entire causal mechanism is about perception and misperception. It is possible that in some
cases, even given the preconditions of the ethnic security dilemma, they will not ultimately fall
into a vicious cycle of action and reaction. In other words, the security dilemma can be
measured in a continuous scale, but there is a threshold beyond which ethnic violence is
triggered. Putting this theoretical explanation at a variable level, we can expect that only if
anarchy, fear, and first strike advantage are large enough that they will have substantial impact
on ethnic group behaviors. Thus the relationship between ethnic security dilemma and ethnic
violence is non-linear.
In addition, the security dilemma is a broad conceptual frame used to think about the
inner dynamics of how conflict arises and its path to some larger violence. A case study or
content analysis that fit relevant factual information into this theory framework may give a
better holistic picture of what happens for a given conflict dyad.
The research design of Melander incorporates the possibility of a non-linear relationship
between the ethnic security dilemma and ethnic violence by making specific cutoffs in coding
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independent variables and dependent variables and transforming them into dummy variables.
So naturally we have to ask, given that model 5 only examines ethnic violence on a discrete
scale, why has the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma is still remained very low,
and in fact, has decreased significantly from previous years of study?
To answer this question, we need to examine the theory in a larger context. As a matter
of fact, the number of ethnic wars (large-scale violence) in the new century dramatically
dropped compared to that of the early 1990s. As Ted Gurr points out:
“…Many new multiethnic democracies have been consolidated, international doctrine
and practices for containing deadly ethnic conflict have been evolved. The UN, regional
organizations in Europe and Africa, and major powers have become more proactive in
answering ethnic quarrels. The net effect has been not to put an end to ethnic conflict but
rather to contain some of its worst consequences and to channel the political energies of
mobilized ethnic groups into conventional politics.”34
The ethnic security dilemma theory was originally used to examine ethnic violence in
post-imperial and post-Cold War periods. However, unlike 20 years ago, the political
environment of both states and international society are less likely to produce a security
dilemma because mechanisms in place will not allow situations of a minor anarchic situation to
materialize into a major ethnic security dilemma.
Figure 1 is a linear regression model consistent with our research approach. But as
discussed earlier, the relationship might be better represented in the graph 2 and 3 discrete
models where less severe ethnic security dilemma does not cause ethnic violence but when the
severity of our independent variable passes certain point, it becomes strongly correlated with
ethnic violence.

34

Minority at Risk 2009, 14.
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Figure 1: Linear model

The differences in preconditions of the security dilemma and the occurrence of ethnic
violence between two different times is demonstrated. In Graph 2, data is evenly spread along
combinations of mild ethnic security dilemma- ethnic violence and severe ethnic security
dilemma-severe ethnic violence where our lines lie. Therefore, Melander’s model is valid in
explaining a large part of the variance. However, in more recent years, conflicts clustered
mainly around the lower ends of both spectrums of ethnic violence and security dilemma where
the model has little explanatory power.
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Figure 2: 1994 Discrete Model (Melander original)

Figure 3: 2005 Discrete Model (Model 5)

Note: the graphs do not use any actual cases to plot the data points. They are hypothetical
situations used for theoretical illustration purpose only.

This qualitative analysis provides possible explanations for my observations of the
quantitative datad as well as strengthens the conclusion of this study. Therefore, future research
should cautiously analyze the case at hand in order to make a sound decision about the
methodology that will be used in a study. As I point out, changes in a variety of factors may
have rendered the ethnic security dilemma theory, to some extent, obsolete. Thus, a mass
quantitative application is unlikely to provide meaningful insight in the future.
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